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FOREWORD
CHILD-CUSTODY DECISIONMAKING
KATHARINE

T. BARTLETT*

ELIZABETH S. ScOTT**

The most famous article on child-custody law, and one of the most
important in family law scholarship altogether, is Robert H. Mnookin's Child
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
published in Law and Contemporary Problems in 1975.1 In that article,

Professor Mnookin analyzed the best-interests-of-the-child standard, which by
the 1970s had emerged as the dominant custody decision rule.2 Although the
best-interests standard seemed on its face to be an uncomplicated and
straightforward way to put the interests of children first in custody
decisionmaking, Professor Mnookin explained its distinctive character and
deficiencies as a legal rule.3 His two core themes were the indeterminacy of the
best-interests standard and the differences between private custody disputes
and those in which the state seeks to take custody of a child from a parent.! The
goal of this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems is to examine the impact
of Professor Mnookin's framework and insights and to analyze developments in
legal and social-science research and in practice since his article imposed
conceptual order on the field.
Professor Mnookin's custody article is so familiar to scholars in the field that
it need not be described in detail, but its most important contributions warrant
a brief summary. First, the article explained how child-custody adjudication
under the best-interests standard differs from adjudication in other legal
contexts.! In the standard legal proceeding, judges apply the law by evaluating
factual evidence of past acts. In applying the best-interests standard, judges
evaluate the parents as persons and make predictions about how each proposed
custodial arrangement will affect the child's future welfare. One problem,
Mnookin explained, is that current knowledge of human behavior is not
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adequate to equip courts to make accurate predictions about various outcomes.'
Just as importantly, no social consensus exists about the values that should
determine which outcomes in fact serve the child's best interests. Mnookin
famously described the challenge, "Deciding what is best for a child poses a
question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself."7 In the
absence of either reliable predictive tools or a social consensus about what is
good for children, Mnookin argued, the best-interests standard in fact does not
provide meaningful guidance, thereby leaving judges to decide cases in
accordance with their own instincts and values.
After exposing the vast indeterminacy of the best-interests standard,
Professor Mnookin explored the implications of this analysis in different
categories of disputes. He identified two very different judicial functions in the
adjudication of child-custody cases-child protection and private dispute
resolution-and argued that they must be distinguished and subject to different
legal standards.' On both pragmatic and philosophical grounds, Mnookin
argued that when the state intervenes to remove a child from parental custody,
decisions should not be based on the discretionary best-interests standard.
Instead he proposed a narrow standard that requires proof by the government
of actual harm to the child of continued parental custody.o
In the context of private dispute resolution, Professor Mnookin ultimately
concluded that no superior alternative to the best-interests standard is
available-despite his devastating critique of its indeterminacy." To bring some
degree of determinacy to these disputes, he recommended what he called
"intermediate rules," 2 which include a preference for awarding custody to an
adult who is the child's psychological parent over one who is a stranger to the
child, and a preference for biological or "natural" parents over other adults, so
long as the biological parent also has a psychological bond to the child."
Although Mnookin acknowledged that his intermediate rules resolve few cases,
he concluded that no more determinate general custody rule, based on gender
or wealth, for example, is satisfactory. Given the inadequacy of the legal
standard, Mnookin advocated for nonjudicial resolution of most custody
disputes through negotiation or mediation, dispute-resolution processes that
were in its infancy in the mid-1970s.14
As the articles in this issue indicate, custody law and practice have evolved
over the past forty years; this evolution reflects the significance of Mnookin's

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 260.
See id. at 260-61.
Id. at 262-91.
Id. at 277-78.
Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 282-87.
Id. at 288-89.
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early work and its enduring influence. Both substantively and procedurally, law
and policy have internalized the differences between the child-protection and
private-dispute-resolution functions. In the child-protection context, standards
for intervening into families to protect children have tightened, both statutorily
at the state and federal level, and as a matter of constitutional doctrine. Less
change is evident in the private-custody context. However, scholars have
proposed, and some legislatures have experimented with, alternatives to the
best-interests standard that are motivated, in part at least, by Professor
Mnookin's indeterminacy critique. In addition, methods of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) to resolve custody disputes have expanded dramatically and
other reforms to enhance parental agreement, such as parenting-plan
requirements, demonstrate the acceptance of Professor Mnookin's confidence,
as a general matter, in the superiority of private ordering over adjudication.
The issue of Law and Contemporary Problems brings together leading legal

scholars and social scientists who study child custody in both the privatedispute-resolution and child-welfare contexts. The variety of their contributions
reflect the enduring relevance of Professor Mnookin's work. Professor Emily
Buss carefully traces the substantial evolution of constitutional law relating to
child custody, concluding that the increasing recognition of parental rights over
the years has been responsive to some of Mnookin's concern for the
indeterminacy of the best-interests standard." Carefully distinguishing the
principle that the law should serve the best interests of children from the bestinterests implementation rule-a distinction accepted by Professor Mnookin
and by all the participants in this issue-Buss argues that the respect for the
rights of parents mandated by the Constitution provides the best doctrinal
foundation for serving the children's interests in both the child welfare and
private dispute contexts. 6
Working within those constitutional limits, Professor Katharine T. Bartlett
and Professors Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Emery challenge Professor
Mnookin's reluctant conclusion that, for resolving private custody disputes, no
better alternative to the best-interests standard is available." They argue on
behalf of a custody rule that uses the proportion of time each parent spent
caring for the child when the parents lived together as a more determinate
guide for allocating the amount of each parent's caretaking responsibility when
the parents separate. The "approximation standard," initially proposed by
Professor Scott in 1992 and adopted by the American Law Institute in 2002 as
the "past caretaking standard," provides a fact-based focus for custody

15. Emily Buss, An Off-Label Use of ParentalRights? The Unanticipated Doctrinal Antidote for
ProfessorMnookin's Diagnosis,77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 1.
16. Id. at 1-2,28.
17. Katharine T. Bartlett, PrioritizingPast Caretaking in Child-Custody Decisionmaking,77 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 29; Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and
Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 1, 2014 at 69.
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adjudication that is more predictable and objective than the best-interests
standard, thus alleviating the many difficulties with the standard that Professor
Mnookin outlines.18
In her comprehensive study of the impact of the ALI proposal, Professor
Bartlett finds that although few jurisdictions have adopted the ALI standard
per se, past caretaking has become increasingly important in custody decisions
rules since the new standard was proposed. 9 Still, based on her examination of
the relationship between the decision rule of a jurisdiction and the predictability
of its case law, Bartlett argues that unless past caretaking is given greater
priority than most states give it, indeterminacy and subjectivity will continue to
be major problems in custody adjudication.20
Given the deficiencies of the best-interests standard as explained by
Professor Mnookin and other scholars, Elizabeth Scott and Robert Emery
probe its puzzling persistence as the dominant legal rule.21 Scott and Emery
argue that the endurance of the best-interests standard is the product of two
interrelated factors. First, advocates for mothers and fathers have been
embroiled in a gender war over custody law that has played out in legislatures
and courts for decades.22 The legislative battle has focused primarily on joint
custody, which women's groups have vigorously opposed, and on protections
from domestic violence, which the same groups have made a high priority.23
Fathers' advocates, in turn, have promoted judicial recognition of a
controversial phenomenon they call the "parental alienation syndrome," which
mothers groups have attempted to refute.24 The upshot, Scott and Emery argue,
has been a political-economy deadlock that has left the best-interests standard
entrenched as the dominant custody rule.25
Second, courts routinely rely on mental-health professionals to assist them
in applying the best-interests standard, a practice that likely has allayed concern
about the standard's indeterminacy. 26 The problem, Scott and Emery argue
(with agreement from a number of the other symposium participants), is that
the child's best interests are not a matter as to which mental-health
professionals have the answers. 27 The authors suggest that exposing the illusion
that psychological experts can overcome the problems inherent in best-interests
determinations is an important step toward reform and better custody
decisionmaking.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Scott & Emery, supra note 17, at 71-72.
Bartlett, supra note 17, at 38.
Id.
Scott & Emery, supra note 17, at 70.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 88-91.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 91-100.
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Whether and to what extent more determinate legal standards can
effectively steer parents toward particular custodial arrangements is the subject
of an article by Bruce Smyth, Richard Chisholm, Bryan Rodgers, and Vu Son,
which is based on extensive research on the impact of Australian reforms
designed to encourage and support shared parenting.29 This empirically rich
article finds that, notwithstanding these reforms, shared parenting (defined as
involving children spending at least thirty percent of their time with each
parent") has plateaued, both among couples negotiating shared-time
arrangements (twenty percent or less") and among shared-time arrangements
ordered by judges (ten percent or less32). Smyth and his colleagues also find that
the level of conflict in separated families in Australia has declined, which they
attribute not to the legal changes favoring shared custody but rather to the
child-sensitive dispute-resolution processes established in Australia and to the
greater support that courts and community-based services offer to families
negotiating their own agreements outside the formal litigation process.3
Kimberley C. Emery and Robert E. Emery explore further the role of
mediation and other forms of ADR in the custody context, expanding on
Professor Mnookin's proposal that most private custody disputes should be
resolved outside of court.34 Emery and Emery describe a substantial body of
research indicating the benefits both to parents and children of ADR, including
the newer forms such as arbitration, custody evaluation and the use of parental
coordinators, all of which can assist parents to reach agreement out of court.
More provocatively perhaps, they argue that separated and divorced parents
and their children are similar in their relationships to families based on
marriage, and that courts should be just as disinclined to intervene in the
disputes of parents living apart as they are to resolve the disputes of married
couples.36 They would limit access of parents to litigation and encourage them to
37
use ADR to make and enforce their agreements.
Jana B. Singer connects some of the legal scholarship and reforms motivated
by Professor Mnookin's work relating to substantive custody standards to the
scholarship and reforms relating to his recommmendations for procedural

29. Bruce Smyth, Richard Chisholm, Bryan Rodgers & Vu Son, Legislating for Shared-Time
ParentingAfter ParentalSeparation:Insights from Australia?,77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014
at 109.
30. Id. at 127,
31. Id. at 137 fig.5.
32. Id. at 136 & fig.4.
33. Id. at 145.
34. Kimberley C. Emery & Robert E. Emery, Who Knows What Is Best for Children? Honoring
Agreements and Contracts Between Parents Who Live Apart, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014
at 151.
35. Id. at 154-62.
36. Id. at 163-67.
37. Id. at 167-75.
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reforms." She reaches two conclusions about the connections between the two.
First, she maintains that the open-ended, indeterminate best-interests standard
was itself partially responsible for some of the shift from adversarial to
nonadversarial dispute resolution.39 Because the results of formal litigation were
uncertain, she argues that parents turned toward dispute-resolution methods
that were more interactive and collaborative.40 Second, she argues that the shift
to nonadversarial dispute resolution, in turn, "de-legalized" or de-emphasized
the custody standards themselves.41 If parents were to work things out
themselves, she explains, they could focus more on planning and
accommodation, rather than decision rules.42
The vast expansion of ADR options is only one of the transformations
affecting the legal and social landscape over the past four decades. This period
has also seen monumental shifts in reproductive technologies, nonmarital
family units, and gay and lesbian parenting. Nancy D. Polikoff reviews how the
law has evolved in response to these changes.43 Professor Polikoff argues that
the dichotomy Mnookin assumed between "natural parents" and "third parties"
has become obsolete, particularly with respect to gay and lesbian parents."
Using cases involving lesbian mothers as her primary focus, she meticulously
demonstrates how this dichotomy is being replaced by a more functional
definition of parent, and she argues that individuals who meet this definition
should be viewed the same as "natural parents," with all of the same rights and
responsibilities.45
The articles in this issue give the greatest amount of attention to private
child-custody disputes, but the issue also recognizes Professor Mnookin's
significant contributions in the child welfare context. As noted above, Emily
Buss tracks developments in the constitutional law that impose the kinds of
restraints on state interference in families that Professor Mnookin argued were
necessary.46 Clare Huntington also notes the profound influence of Professor
Mnookin's work in the child-welfare context.47 She argues, however, that
despite the legal reforms that have occurred in the last forty years-many of
them embracing Mnookin's proposals for more determinate standards-most of

38. Jana B. Singer, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Best-Interests Standard: The Close Connection
Between Substance and Process in Resolving Divorce-Related ParentingDisputes, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 177.
39. Id. at 178-85.
40. Id. at 179-82.
41. Id. at 186-93.
42. Id. at 186-90.
43. Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their
Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 195.
44. Id. at 195-96.
45. Id. at 197-204.
46. Buss, supra note 15.
47. Clare Huntington, The Child-Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1,2014 at 221.
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the same systemic problems that he noted forty years ago remain.48 Professor
Huntington emphasizes two specific problems. First, the states and the federal
government have not invested sufficient resources to develop the programs that
would actually prevent the need for out-of-home placements.49 Second,
although more determinate standards of the sort recommended by Professor
Mnookin have moved children out of foster care more quickly, the shorter time
frames mean that fewer parents are able to do what is required of them for the
return of their children."o Given the shortage of permanent alternatives, what
this means is that many children never find a permanent home." Professor
Huntington's analysis suggests that the solution is not new or better legal
standards, but rather a greater commitment of public resources to prevent the
necessity of removing children from their parents in the first place.52
As this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems demonstrates, the

contributions of Professor Mnookin's analysis of the best-interests standard,
and of child custody-dispute resolution, have been remarkably enduring.
Although the legal and social landscape has shifted in astounding and
unpredictable ways, Professor Mnookin's work remains the reference point in
custody law scholarship and policy discussions-no less today, than over the
forty years since Law and Contemporary Problems first published his work. The
special editors, authors, and extraordinarily conscientious and capable editors
of Law and Contemporary Problems are proud to have been a part of the

evaluation of this impressive legacy.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 231-38.
Id. at 238-41.
Id.
Id. at 245-48.

